"There are two forms of teleological explanation (Lennox 1992). External teleological explanation derives from Plato - a goal is imposed by an agent, a mind, which has intentions and purpose. Internal teleological explanation derives from Aristotle, and is a functional notion. Aristotle divided causes up into four kinds - material (the stuff of which a thing is made), formal (its form or structure), efficient (the powers of the causes to achieve the things they achieve) and final (the purpose or end for which a thing exists). Internal teleology is really a kind of causal explanation in terms of the value of the thing being explained. This sort of teleology doesn't impact on explanations in terms of efficient causes. You can, according to Aristotle, use both.
Evolutionary explanations are most nearly like Aristotle's formal and efficient causes. Any functional explanation begs the further question - what is the reason why that function is important to that organism? - and that begs the even further question - why should that organism exist at all? The answers to these questions depend on the history of the lineage leading to the organism.
External teleology is dead in biology, but there is a further important distinction to be made. Mayr [1982: 47-51] distinguished four kinds of explanations that are sometimes called teleology: telenomic (goal-seeking, Aristotle's final causes, 'for-the-sake-of-which' explanations); teleomatic (lawlike behaviour that is not goal-seeking); adapted systems (which are not goal seeking at all, but exist just because they survived); and cosmic teleologyO'Grady and Brooks 1988]. Only systems that are actively directed by a goal are truly teleological. Most are just teleomatic, and some (e.g., genetic programs) are teleonomic (internal teleology), because they seek an end."
Esse raciocínio muitas vezes explica o aparecimento de doenças que, assim, não necessitam mais ser vistas como maldições à espécie humana. A razão médica se beneficiaria do pensamento evolucionário que pode estar distante da prática clínica, mas traria de volta sua historicidade. Afinal, a história de um ser vivo, tão cara a Mayr, é o que o diferencia de um ente inanimado; e o que o torna irredutível à físico-química, sem recorrer a explicações vitalistas.
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